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An attempt to document commonly believed misconceptions about Tor.
Content will appear here once I have gained sufficient vitriol...
## Know your adversary
Not all of the situations or recommendations covered in this document apply to all adversaries and inversely following all of the recommendations in this document will not protect you from all adversaries.
This is a set of general recommendations, created as counter-points to common misconceptions about how best to use Tor that I've observed in the wild, talking to users and trying to support and assist users.
You should consider who or what it is you're trying to defend against and what they're capable of. Understanding an adversary's technical capabilities can be difficult to discern for users and is often specific to the user making it difficult, if not impossible, to create sound advice for the general use case. I've tried, where possible, to illustrate what kind of capabilities an adversary would need to exploit the various potential pitfalls but I can't tell you if your adversary actually has that capability.
## Is a VPN more secure because Exits are untrustworthy?
### What does a VPN see?
* Who you are.
* Who you're talking to.
* What you and the other party are discussing.
### What does an Exit see?